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A Theoretical Framework for Cost Allocations 
in a Monopoly System with Application to the 
Allocation of Transmission Losses 
Haoming Liu, Junji Wu, Yun Zou, Fushuan Wen, Yixin Ni, Senior Member ,  IEEE, and 
F. F.  Wu, Fellow, IEEE 
Abstract-In this paper, fundamental characteristics of a 
general monopolistic service system with a simple structure am 
first investigated, and a theoretical framework for allocations of 
common costs is then developed. The concepts of ‘‘fairness’’ and 
“rationality” am characterized mathematically for the general 
cost allocation problem. Under the proposed framework, several 
available allocation methods of transmission losses could be well 
unified. 
Index Terms--Monopolistic service system, cost allocation, 
fairness and rationality axioms, active power losses. 
I. INTRODUC~ON 
OWER industry restructuring has necessitated the P decomposition of the three sectors, i.e., generation, 
transmission and distribution. In the new market environment, 
transmission open access (TOA) provides a “fair playing 
field” for power suppliers to compete in the bid-based 
operation, and for all participants to access and use the 
transmission facilities. In order to make sure that the 
transmission service provided is fair to all participants and 
existing transmission facilities could he utilized efficiently 
and reasonably, adequate transmission pricing or appropriate 
transmission cost allocation is very important. Due to 
geographical, economic and technical reasons, the 
transmission system will remain a monopoly in the emerging 
electricity market environment. 
One of the major aspects in transmission pricing or 
transmission cost allocation is the allocation of transmission 
losses. In the traditional vertically integrated power industry, 
transmission losses were not dealt with separately hut rather 
included in the total cost and recovered by averagely 
allocating the cost to customers. In the electricity market 
environment, the problem of allocating transmission losses to 
different participants becomes a very important problem. The 
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well-known nonlinear characteristic of the power flow 
equations makes the problem of rigorously and accurately 
allocating the losses, from the viewpoint of mathematics, an 
impossible task. 
Several approximate methods or criteria have recently been 
proposed. Among them, reference [l], (21 proposed the 
method based on the square of current, while in [31-[5] the 
equal proportional share of current was assumed. Another 
method is to allocate the cross-losses in proportion to current 
[21, [6], [7]. Since different simplification assumptions are 
made in these methods, it is difficult to evaluate which one is 
better than others. Since it is not possible to find a 
mathematically solid approach for allocating transmission 
losses, some generally accepted principles must he followed, 
such as fairness and rationality. However, it is quite difficult, 
if not impossible, to rigorously define the so-called fairness 
and rationality, some generally accepted axioms from 
sociology and economics disciplines have to he employed for 
this purpose. 
Given this background, it is the objective of this paper to 
investigate fundamental characteristics of a general 
monopolistic service system with a simple structure and then 
based on these to develop a theoretical framework for 
allocations of common costs. Under this framework, several 
existing methods for transmission loss allocations could he 
well unified. 
11. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
In this section, a simple model of the monopoly system will 
he used for illustrating the general characteristics of the cost 
allocation problem. 
Let S he a public server in a general sense, and X, 
(k=1,2, ..., n) is a user of the monopoly system. The total 
number of users, i.e., n ( 1 S n 9 N ), is variable, and this 
means that all users could enter or quit the system freely. 
Assume that x, t 0 ( k = 1,2, ..., n ) is the service quantity 
from server S to user X,, and the service capability (such as 
transmission capacity) is not taken into account. Further, 
assume that the common cost (such as transmission losses) 
function K“ ( x )  , x = [xI,x2,, ..,x,T E R“ is piecewise 
continuous. 
Without loss of generality, suppose that the unit price of 
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cost (losses) is 1, then numerically vn (x)equals the cost. For 
simplicity, we define the above system model as ( S , X , K , , ] .  
Let ( S , X , K J = U ( S , X , K , , )  . If S is the only and 
unsuhstitutable server to all the users, we say ( S , X , K ]  is 
monopolistic. 
A. Basic Characteristics of the Model 
N 
"=I 
Definition I :  Suppose x = [xI ,x2 , .  . , x , p  E R" , xk 2 0 , 
k =1,2 ,..., n . ( S , X , h J  is said to he no different, if the 
followings hold simultaneously, 
Identity of service measurement: all x , ,  k = l,2, ..., n , 
have the same property and dimension. 
User independence: all users are function independent, 
and this means that there does not exist any nonzero 
function U :R" -+ R to make U ( X )  = 0. 
1 )  
2) 
Definition 2: The cost function K" ( x )  is called regular if 
1) Positive definite: the cost function is non-negative: 
(1) 
2) Symmetry: K " ( x )  is no different to all users X, 
( k = 1.2 ,..., n , 1 I n I N  ), i.e. the function value 
remains unchanged if any two elements of vector x are 
exchanged. 
Generally speaking, I )  is mandatory for the cost function, 
Definition 3: ( S , X , r )  is said to be a simple service system 
K" ( x )  2 0 ,  K" (0) = 0 
and 2) is used to simplify the structure of the cost function. 
if it is no different and the cost function rn ( x )  is regular. 
This means that in a simple service system the users are 
equal with simple cost structures. From now on, all problems 
to be discussed are based on the simple service system. 
Suppose 
c o r e [ ~ ~ , ( x ) l  = q ( x )  - C q ( x , e , )  ( 2 )  
k=, 
where, e, = [O ,..., 0,1,0 ,..., 0lT E R" is a n-dimension vector 
with the k-th element as I and all the other elements as zero. 
Definition 4:  c o r e [ q ( x ) ]  is called an inseparable core of 
K, ( x )  . '5, ( x )  is said to be separable if core[ rn ( x ) ]  = 0 . 
B. Principles of Cost Allocarions and Analysis of the Cost 
Structure 
The two problems, i.e. cost allocation and cost structure 
analysis, are of course different but tightly related. An axiom 
system is built for the cost allocation in the previously defined 
simple service system from the viewpoint of sociology and 
economics disciplines. 
1)  An Axiom System: 
Let Q,,,(x) be the cost share allocated to user X, , 
k = 1,2 ,..., n , 15 n I N , in the simple service system 
{ S , X , x n J .  A set of fairness and rationality axioms for the 
cost allocation is presented helow [ 8 ] .  
Fairness Axiom 1 (Validity): AN allocated cost shares are 
non-negative, and the sum of them is equal to the total cost. 
Qx..(x) 2 0  C Q , . , ( x ) = r , ( x )  (3) 
k = I  
Fairness Axiom 2 (No-Use-No-Pay): Q,,"(X) = O  , if 
xk = o .  
Fairness Axiom 3 (Equity): Assume that the cost allocation 
is usage-based. Mathematically, this means that exchanging 
arbitrarily two elements xk,x,  in vector x ,  the values of 
Q,.(x) and Q,,,(x) ( k , l  = 1,2,. ..,n, 15 n S N ) should also 
he exchanged, 
Qk," (x,, x z , .  . .. xk ,. . ., x i , .  . ., x.) 
= Q , , n ( x , ~ x ,  ...., x I .  ... x,  ,... , x n )  
Q,,n(x,, xz ,. . . ,xk ,. ... xi ,. . .J" 1 
= Q , .  ( x l , x z , .  . , x I  ,. ... xk ,. .., x , )  
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
Fairness Axiom 4 (Monotonic increase): The allocated cost 
is monotonically increasing with the usage, i.e. Q,,"(x) is 
strictly monotonically increasing with respect to xk 
Rationaliry Axiom I (Separability property): Each user pay 
the cost it incurred naturally in a separable system, i.e. 
Q,,"(x)  = p ( x , ) ,  if ( S , X , K ~ ]  , l I n S N  is a separable 
system. 
Rationality Axiom 2 (Simple combination additivity): Any 
simple combination or division would not influence the 
system structure, i.e. for any xk , xn+, , k = 1,2 ,..., n , 
l < n <  N-1, we have 
Qk,n(x,,x, ...., + x , + ~ , x ~ + ,  ,... x,,)  
( 5 )  
= Qk,"+, (xs 3 xz ,. . ., xm+i) + Q n + i , n + i ( ~ i  2 xz 9. . ,x,+i 1 
Remark I :  The four faimess axioms ensure that all users be 
treated equally in cost allocations, while the rationality axioms 
assure that coalition among users could not lead to more 
profits for the users concerned. 
2) Economics Principle: 
We could not obtain a definite allocation method directly 
from the axioms stated before since the applicable allocation 
functions are not unique. On the other hand, since there exists 
a tight relationship between the cost structure and the cost 
allocation, we have to resort to economics principle for 
tackling the problem. An allocation mechanism which meets 
the fairness and rationality axioms is presented here based on 
the well-known marginal costs. 
The marginal cost of user X, ( k  = 1,2,.. .,n , IS n 5 N ) is, 
u x )  =a w ) / a x ,  (6) 
A small increment of r;, ( x )  could be expressed as 
(7) 
3) Methodology: 
Before applying the above procedure to cost allocations, we 
have to first determine how to deal with the cost structure and 
the production process of costs concerned. 
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Global Principle: All the costs i;. ( x )  are to he allocated. 
Local Principle: Only the inseparable core, i.e. 
core[xn(x)l, is to he allocated, and the separable parts are 
allocated directly. 
Static principle: The costs to he allocated only relate to the 
final result q [ x ( T ) ]  , and not to the intermediate result 
Dynamic Principle: The costs to be allocated relate to not 
only the final result xn [ x ( T ) ]  ,hut also the intermediate result 
K" Lx(t)l 1 f E  [O,TI. 
h; , [x (O I .  f~ [ O J I .  
111. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COST ALLOCATION IN 
THE SIMPLE SERVICE SYSTEM 
Based on the work of previous sections, a method based on 
marginal losses is presented here for allocation of 
transmission network losses. Suppose that the cost function of 
each user is monotonically increasing, i.e., for any 
k = 1,2 ,..., n , 1 < n 4 N , the function = a r n ( x ) / & ,  is 
non-negative. For simplicity, A , " ( x )  is sometimes 
abbreviated as 4 or A ( x ) .  For any [ S , X , q ] ,  l S n S N ,  
we have 
(8) 
(9) 
where 4 is the marginal cost of user X ,  , and pk = p k ( x )  is 
the allocated share of user X ,  , p=[p, ... p , p  , 
k = 1 , 2  ,..., n .  
Eq. (8) denotes the allocated share for a unit service 
quantity, and Eq. (9) the ratio to marginal costs. what the 
users are concerned with most is how to minimize the average 
costs showed in (8), and this means that the norm of the 
vector in (8) should be minimized. From the marginal cost 
principle, it is known that the norm of the vector in (9) should 
also he minimized. To take into account of these two 
requirements, a tradeoff has to he made. Let us consider the 
following programming problem, 
min la'(p)P(p)l 
k = 1  
This implies 
& ( X ) [ X I / P ,  (x)I=%(x)[x,/p, ( x ) l = ~ ~ ' = / Z , ( x ) [ ~ , / P n  (XI1
(11) 
Eq. (11) indicates that the ratio is allocated based on the 
service quantity if the marginal costs are taken as the penalty 
factor. 
There are two important and useful lemmas as stated 
below. 
Lemma I: Suppose [ S , X , r J  is a simple service system, 
then 
I )  There exists a function p(X), X is a scalar, for any 
I <  k < n  , 15 n 4 N ,  we have 
%"(?ek) =a(?) (12) 
here, e, =[0 ,..., OJ,O ,..., OIr E R" is a n-dimension 
vector with the k-th element as 1 and the others as zero. 
The inseparable core, i.e., core[xn(x)l, is symmetric, 
this means that the function value will remain 
unchanged if any two elements in vector x are 
exchanged. 
2) 
Proof: According to the symmetry of the cost structure, 
for any 15 k , l 5  n , k tl, we have q ( Y e , )  = q(Xe, ) ,  
therefore ( I  2) holds. Then 
core[rr,(x)l = q ( x )  -Cp(X,) 
k = l  
is symmetric. 0 
Lemma 2: Suppose [S,X,xJ is a simple service system, if 
Ak5,,(x)=dq(x)/dx, , then & ( x )  is an equivalent 
function, i.e. for any 1 4 k , l  5 n , k # I ,  we have 
a ,..., x X  ,_ , . , x n )  = & , J ~ ~ ,  .. .  ,. . . .xk  ,. .., x , )  
&,"(XI ,..., X k  ...., X I  ,..., x , )  = A,.,(X, ...., XI ,..., Xk ,.... x . )  
X." 
Proof: According to the symmetry of the cost structure, 
we have 
Lk," (x ,  1.. . , X k  ,..., X I . .  . . , x, 
= liml [xn (XI,. . ., x k  +A, .  . ., xI , . . . , x , )  
- xn (xI ,..., x k , .  .., xI,.. ., X, )]/AI 
= lim( [xn ( x ,  , . . . , x, , . . ., xX +A,.  . ., x,)  
- K n ( X l  ..... xI .... ,x , ,  .... xn)I/AJ 
A-0 
8-0 
= & . , ( I  ,...., XI ...., X k  ,..., X " )  
It should he mentioned that the equivalent property in 
lemma 2 and the symmetry in definition 2 are completely 
different. 
A. Static Method 
From (1 I), we have, 
(13) 
So a static global allocation method could be formulated as 
Q,,"(x)  = [ X ~ ~ ~ ( X M ~ ( X ) I  ~ [ x l & ( x ) l  (14) L 
and a static local allocation method as 
Qk., (x)  = + v ( x , )  (15) 
p(xX)  is already defined in (12). 
service system, then 
Theorem I: Suppose [ S , X , K ]  is a gaining type simple 
1) The static global allocation method as shown in (14) 
satisfies all the fairness axioms. 
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2 )  The static local allocation method as shown in (15) 
satisfies not only all the fairness axioms, hut also the 
separability property rationality axiom. 
The proof procedure is omitted here due to the space 
limitation. 
B. Dynamic Method 
To obtain the allocation result in view of the dynamic 
property, we can calculate an incremental quantity first, and 
then sum them up. From (7). the increment function in time f 
is, 
dKn [x( f ) l  = ClJx~[x( t ) l /ax , ( r ) l , , ( t )dr  
, = I  
which marginal function is the same as that in (6). 
allocation method as follow, 
From (13) to (15), we can obtain the dynamic global 
Q,,nCx) = 
lor lx, (04 [x (Ol t  {Laxn (x(t))lax, ( f )k  (Ol/t M)? [x(f)l tldt 
(16) 
IC1 lil 
and the dynamic local allocation method, 
Q , , ~ c ~ )  = ~ o ~ ~ ~ , ~ t ~ / ? r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c r ~ c ~ r e [ ~ ~ ~ x ~ t ~ ~ i / a x , ~ r ~ i j ; , ~ t ~ ~  
/$ l ~ l ( ~ ) ~ l , [ x ( f ) l  1 ldt  +j;&, (Wf 
where, @x,(t ) ]  is the separable allocated share to user X, in 
time I. 
Theorem 2 (Dynamic faimess theorem): Suppose {S, x,K) 
is a gaining type simple service system, and the marginal cost 
functions of all users are monotonically increasing, i.e. 
&(x) = axn(x)/dx, is the non-negative monotonically 
increasing function of x, for any k = 12  ,..., n , 15 n 5 N . 
Then 
1 )  The dynamic global allocation method as defined in 
(16) satisfies all the fairness axioms. 
2 )  The dynamic local allocation method 3s defined in 
(17) satisfies not only all the fairness axioms, hut also 
the separability property rationality axiom. 
The proof procedure is omitted here due to the space 
lil 
I=i 
(17) 
limitation. 
IV. ALLOCATION OF ACTIVE POWER LOSSES IN TRANSMISSION 
SYSTEMS 
Several different allocation methods for active power losses 
in transmission systems.rould he obtained by applying the 
theoretical framework developed before. Specific to this 
problem, S is TRANSCO, K. (x) is the active power losses in 
a given branch m, x, ( k  = l;..,n) is the current I, of another 
branch k connecting with branch m. Suppose that all 
transmission losses are undertaken by consumers, the problem 
is how to allocate the active losses or branch m to all users 
concerned. We have 
'C,(x) = C ( C x d 2  (18) ,=, 
here, C i s  a constant. 
A. Proportional Share on Toral Losses 
(14) and (18), we have 
Q,.,Cx) = 
If the static global allocation method is employed, from 
lx,/?r ( x ) k ,  (XI1 
2[x,&(x)l 
1=1 
where 
and then we have 
Q ( x )  x A (x) i; x - = 
Q,,W x j A j ( x )  x j  
The allocated shares are proportional to currents, and the 
same conclusion was obtained in L31 and [41. This allocation 
method satisfies all fairness axioms, and simple combination 
additivity axiom because of A,(x) = Aj(x) = 2 C 2 x I  , 
B. Proportional Share on Inseparable Core 
allocation method we have 
1=I  
Similarly, from (15) and (18). by following the static local 
In this case the allocated shares are proportional to the 
currents in the inseparable core, and the separable parts could 
he allocated to users directly. The same conclusion could he 
obtained in [6] and [7]. This allocation method satisfies all 
fairness and rationality axioms. 
C. Allocation of Losses Based on the Square of Current 
If d ( x )  - " , A, = a(Cx,')/ax, = ZCx, , we can conclude 
q x )  x, 
that the allocation method is based on the square of current 
using either the global method or the local method. Hence, 
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based on the theoretical framework developed, we can get the 
same conclusion as that in [ I ]  and 121. 
From the above results, it could be concluded that the 
developed theoretical framework could well unify several 
available transmission loss allocation methods. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this work, a theoretical framework for cost allocation in 
a general monopoly system is developed from the viewpoints 
of sociology and economics. Sevcral fairness and rationality 
axioms are presented. Based on the framework, several 
different allocation principles are proposed and discussed. 
Finally, the problem of allocating active power losses in 
transmission systems is investigated, and it is concluded that 
several existing transmission loss allocation methods could be 
well unified in the proposed theoretical framework. 
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